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Abstract
We propose a simple theoretical model of supervised learning that is potentially
useful to interpret a number of empirical phenomena relevant to the nature-nurture
debate. The model captures a basic trade-oﬀ between sheltering the child from the
consequences of his mistakes, and allowing him to learn from experience. We character-
ize the optimal parenting policy and its comparative-statics properties. We then show
that key features of the optimal policy can be useful to interpret provocative ﬁndings
from behavioral genetics.
1 Introduction
The nature-nurture debate has been one of the most controversial in the social sciences.1
Since the 1980s, the literature on behavioral genetics has presented data that is broadly
interpreted as tilting the balance strongly toward nature.2 Some go so far as to say that
this literature provides evidence that parents have very little (or no) eﬀect on a variety of
measures of the personality of their children.3 At the same time, in wealthy countries, the
amount of resources invested by parents in their children has reached all–time highs. How
can we reconcile the enormous resources invested in children with evidence that parenting
explains an extremely small fraction of the variation in the characteristics of children?
This paper provides a model of optimal parenting that can help resolve this contra-
diction. In the model we propose, the behavior of parents has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the
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1For some history on this debate, see Pinker [53].
2For an overview of this literature, see Plomin et al. [55] or Reiss et al [56]. Some of the ﬁndings of this
literature have been popularized by Harris [44], [45], Pinker [53] and Ridley [58].
3See for instance Harris [44], [45], Pinker [53] and Ridley [58].
1characteristics of their children. Yet, the model predicts a distribution of outcomes in the
population of children that is consistent with the data from behavioral genetics. This calls
into question the interpretation of such data that has been made in this literature. In
fact, unlike the standard analytical framework of behavioral genetics, our model allows an
interpretation of the features of the environment that are likely to generate these patterns.
Furthermore, the model provides a novel interpretation of heritability measures.
To provide some background for our analysis, the literature on the consequences of
parenting is virtually unanimous in recognizing that parental support is essential for func-
tional development in extreme situations.4 The nature-nurture debate pertains mainly to
diﬀerences within the ‘normal’ range of variation in parenting. A sizable literature across
the social sciences argues that these diﬀerences can have important eﬀects. In particular,
“socialization research” attempts to relate variation in parenting styles with measures of
adjustment.5
The behavioral genetics literature starts with a criticism of much of socialization re-
search for failing to recognize that the correlations between parenting styles and children’s
outcomes could be due to the shared genes between parents and their biological children.
Behavioral geneticists then attempt to isolate the eﬀects of the genes through two com-
plementary approaches. The more direct one is to compare twins raised together by their
biological parents with twins raised apart by diﬀerent adoptive families.6 One of the prob-
lems with this approach is the limited number of twins raised apart. The other approach
is to compare outcomes for children with varying degrees of genetic and environmental
relatedness and employ statistical techniques to estimate the percentage of variation in
personality traits that is explained by genetic factors. The ﬁndings of this literature paint
a very diﬀerent picture of the eﬀects of parents. For instance, behavioral genetics studies
consistently ﬁnd that twins reared together are just as similar as twins reared apart. In fact,
some studies even ﬁnd that twins reared together are less similar than twins reared apart.
These ﬁndings are interpreted according to a simple statistical model (known as the ACE
model) as evidence that, once one controls for genetic factors, the impact of traditional
measures of family environment on most personality traits is greatly diminished.7
4Harlow and coauthors (cf. [41], [42]) separated infant monkeys from their mothers; these subjects
developed severe emotional and cognitive problems. The discovery of children in Romanian orphanages,
who were raised with very little human contact, provided a tragic counterpart to these studies, leading to
similar conclusions. These children were in the third to tenth percentile for physical growth, and “grossly
delayed” in motor and mental development (Chisholm [26]).
5For a survey, see for instance Collins et al. [28] and Demo and Cox [32].
6There are several parallel projects that gather information on this front. The ﬁrst, large-scale project
of this kind was the Minnesota twin study: see Bouchard et al. [19].
7This broad conclusion is subject to two qualiﬁcations: ﬁrst, there is evidence that improvements in the
2We develop a model of supervised learning that permits a very diﬀerent interpretation
of the same ﬁndings. In our model, children’s characteristics evolve through interactions
with both the environment and their parents; therefore, every parent faces a basic trade-oﬀ
between sheltering the child from the consequences of his mistakes, and allowing him to
learn from experience. The key ingredients of our model are as follows:
• The parent is solely interested in the child’s welfare, and is active for T periods. The
child is active for L > T periods.
• In each period, the child must perform some task. The parent has better information
than the child about the correct way to perform it.
• The child learns by doing: at the end of each period, he receives a signal about the
quality of his performance. However, learning is costly: the child’s per-period payoﬀ
is lower the worse his performance.
• The parent’s actions simultaneously modify (typically increase) the child’s per-period
payoﬀ and distort (typically bias) the child’s signal about his performance.
We characterize the optimal parenting policy and its comparative-statics properties. In
particular, we show that the optimal policy of the parent partially shelters the child, im-
plying that learning may be slowed down by the presence of the parent; on the other hand,
the child learns at a smaller cost than if he were on his own. We also investigate the
dynamics and comparative statics of parental intervention: see Sec. 2.1 for details.
We then use the key implications of the model to tackle the nature-nurture debate
[19, 54, 58]. In particular, since the parent partially shelters the child from the consequences
of his mistakes, her intervention is a function of the child’s initial abilities, which we can
think of as being genetically determined. Borrowing terminology from recent contributions
to behavioral genetics, parental intervention is thus genetically mediated. Furthermore, on
average, adoptive parents optimally shelter their children more than biological parents;8 as
a result, genes play a greater role in determining outcomes of adoptive children. This key
implication enables our model to match the empirical ﬁndings from behavioral genetics
for a broad and easily interpretable range of parameter choices. We also show that, in
the optimal policy, parents behave more similarly with monozygotic (identical) twins than
family environment has positive eﬀects on children’s cognitive ability, if one restricts attention to families of
low socioeconomic status (Turkheimer et al. [68]). Second, and of more immediate relevance to the present
paper, recent studies suggest the intriguing possibility that parental intervention may actually respond to
speciﬁc, genetically-determined traits of the child, and thus reinforce or attenuate them (Reiss et al [56]).
Thus, family environment may have signiﬁcant eﬀects, even though its impact is “genetically mediated.”
8See sec. 3 for a discussion of the evidence supporting this.
3with dizygotic (fraternal) twins; therefore, the greater similarity of monozygotic twins is
partly due to the concordance of parental intervention.
1.1 Additional Background Literature
Learning has been exhaustively investigated in theoretical models by economists, statis-
ticians, and psychologists.9 However, these studies typically abstract from the fact that
learning takes place under the supervision of parents, caregivers, teachers, advisors, and
other experts for a considerable fraction of an individual’s life. The economics literature
has developed several models of investment in child quality, starting at least with Becker
[7]); a particularly relevant contribution is the recent paper by Cunha and Heckman [31],
which analyzes the optimal life-cyle proﬁle of investments in children in a model with dy-
namic complementarities. This approach enables the authors to capture some important
facts about child development.
An enormous literature in developmental psychology addresses the eﬀects of parental
care on the development of children.10 Yet, formal modeling of supervised learning, i.e.
the relation between parental behavior and its eﬀects on children’s learning processes, is
almost absent. This is the focus of the present paper.
The behavioral-genetics literature typically focuses on personality traits and measures
of cognitive achievements, and does not typically explore outcomes such as educational
attainment or earnings. In the economics literature, the degree to which a child’s home
environment supports learning (as measured e.g. by how often the mother reads to her
child, or whether she helps him learn numbers) has been shown in some studies to have
signiﬁcant eﬀects on cognitive achievement.11 Recent contributions by Sacerdote [62, 63],
Bjorklund, Lindahl and Plug [16] and others are methodologically closer to the behavioral-
genetics literature. For instance, Sacerdote [63] analyzes a sample of Korean children
randomly assigned to American adoptive families; he ﬁnds that maternal education has a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the educational attainment of adopted children, but a much
larger eﬀect on that of biological children. Bjorklund et al. [16] analyze Swedish adoption
9In economics there is a vast literature that studies learning from various points of view: from Bayesian
learning to adaptive learning to ﬁctitious play. On theory, see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine [37]. Camerer
[23], chapter 6 discusses both theory and experiments.
10It is impossible to be exhaustive in providing references. See Shonkoﬀ and Deborah Phillips eds. [64]
for a recent overview of the ﬁeld with respect to early childhood development.
11See e.g. Carneiro, Heckman, and Masterov [24] and Todd and Wolpin [67]. Also, a sizable literature
investigates the eﬀects of maternal employment on children’s cognitive achievement. Results are mixed:
some ﬁnd that employment is detrimental (Baydar and Brooks-Gunn, [6]; Desai et. al. [33]; Belsky and
Eggebeen [8], Bernal [12]), others that it is beneﬁcial (Vandell and Ramanan [69]). See also the debate on
the eﬀects of family size and birth order (e.g., Black, Devereux, and Salvanes) [17].
4data and report signiﬁcant eﬀects for both adoptive and biological parents. Moreover, they
ﬁnd evidence for a positive interaction eﬀect between postbirth environment (nurture) and
prebirth factors (nature): as we discuss in Sec. 3, this is consistent with our approach.
Parental care is essential for the survival of infants and young children; indeed, this
is the case for all mammals and many other animal species. However, there are vast
diﬀerences in ‘parenting strategies’ across human societies. The structure of human families
and the relation of parents to their children has signiﬁcantly evolved through the course
of human evolution.12 Even in present-day societies, anthropologists have documented
considerable heterogeneity in the way parents interact with their children.13 Developmental
psychologists have also provided a classiﬁcation of parenting styles for Western societies.14
Finally, as regards mammals and other animals, there is an enormous amount of cross-
species variation in the degree to which parents invest resources in their young.15
2 “Hand-Holding”
2.1 The basic model
Agents and Horizon. The model features two agents, the child (he) and the parent (she).
The child lives for L > 1 periods, whereas the parent is active (i.e., able to supervise the
child) for T < L periods.
Actions and Payoﬀs The child must perform a task in every period. The real number
M represents the correct way to perform the task on average; however, the correct way
to perform the task at time t = 1,...,L is represented by i.i.d. normal random variables
X1,...,XL; every Xt has a normal distribution, with mean M and precision pX.
12See Lancaster and Lancaster [51] for a discussion of the very diﬀerent parent/child relation that must
have existed in hunter-gatherer societies relative to that in societies based on agriculture, and to that of
modern parents.
13For example, Lamport-Commons and Miller [50], and Richman et al. [57] describe parental practices
among the Gusii Kenyians and Highland Mayans, and highlight stark diﬀerences as compared to behavior
in the typical Western family. Blurton-Jones [18] describes studies of two populations of foragers of the
sub-Saharan savanna: the !Kung and the Hadza. He documents that the former appear to adopt a much
more protective and close relation with their infants as compared to the latter. Interestingly, this author
suggests that this diﬀerence in parenting styles may be partly related to the harsher conditions of the land
inhabited by the !Kung, and that this also leads to large diﬀerences in fertility between the !Kung and the
Hadza.
14For instance, authoritative parenting, which is characterized by high levels of warmth, support and
control is thought to be more eﬀective than either authoritarian (which lacks warmth) or permissive (which
lacks control) styles of parenting. See for instance the seminal study by Baumrind [5], and also Collins et
al. [28] and Demo and Cox [32] for reviews of this literature.
15See for example Clutton-Brock [27].
5The parent’s and the child’s actions at time t are also real numbers, respectively denoted
by ¯ at and ¯ bt. If, at time t, the parent chooses action ¯ at, the child chooses action ¯ bt, and
the correct way to perform the task is Xt, then the child incurs a loss of
(Xt + ¯ at −¯ bt)2.
As we discuss below in greater detail, the parent knows M, the correct way to perform the
task on average, and can also anticipate the child’s choice ¯ bt: thus, the parent’s action ¯ at
is eﬀectively a correction for the child’s average mistake.
Both the parent and the child wish to minimize discounted expected losses, given their
respective information; thus, the parent is altruistic, The parent discounts per-period losses
at a rate δ ∈ (0,1). The child’s discount factor may or may not coincide with that of the
parent; however, because of subsequent assumptions, this plays no role in the analysis.
Information and Policies. The child does not know M, but has prior beliefs about it.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that, from the child’s point of view, M is normally distributed,
with mean M0 and precision p0. Similarly, as far as the child is concerned, the correct way
to perform the task at time t, namely Xt, has a normal distribution conditional upon M,
with mean M and precision pX. The child also assumes that X1,...,XL are conditionally
independent.
The child chooses his action at at the beginning of each period t. Upon completing the
task, he receives feedback about his performance; however, he cannot distinguish between
the consequences of his own choice and those of his parent’s intervention. We model this
by assuming that, at the end of each period t, the child observes the sum Xt +at, but not
its separate components Xt and at.
The parent knows M, and also observes the realization of Xt at the end of period t.
Furthermore, the parent knows the child’s prior.16
Now temporarily suppose that the child was facing a standard learning model, without
a parent. Under the usual assumption that the child minimizes his discounted expected
losses, his optimal choice at time t would be the conditional expectation of M (equivalently,
Xt) given the prior history. In particular, under the above normality assumptions, this
takes a particularly convenient form:
E[Xt|X1 = x1,...,Xt−1 = xt−1] =
p0M0 + pX
Pt−1
s=1 xs
p0 + (t − 1)pX
. (1)
16This is not particularly restrictive in this version of the model. If the parent does not know the value
of M0 but anticipates the form of the child’s policy, he can learn M0 in one period, provided he knows p0.
Otherwise, he can learn both M0 and p0 in two periods.
6If instead the child faces a supervised-learning model, his optimal choices depend in part
upon his understanding of the parent’s own intervention policy. Our baseline model as-
sumes that the child disregards the parent’s inﬂuence on his learning environment. For-
mally, he acts as if ¯ at = 0. We think of this as an interesting polar case that is helpful as
an initial step. We also pursue a “textbook equilibrium” approach in the Web Appendix;
our main ﬁndings remain true in this alternative model.
As a consequence of this assumption, at any time t ≤ T + 1, after observing x1 +
¯ a1,...,xt−1 + ¯ at−1, the child’s optimal action is his conditional expectation of Xt:
Ma
t ≡ E[Xt|X1 = x1 + ¯ a1,...,Xt−1 = xt−1 + ¯ at−1] =
p0M0 + pX
Pt−1
s=1(xs + ¯ as)
p0 + (t − 1)pX
. (2)
A similar expression for the conditional expectation Ma
t applies to periods t > T +1, when
the prior history includes dates at which the parent is not active: see the Appendix for
details. Also notice for future reference that Ma
0 = M0.
Comparing Eqs. (1) and (2) immediately shows that parental intervention distorts
the child’s learning process. On the other hand, parental intervention directly aﬀects the
child’s per-period payoﬀ; in particular, the expected time-t penalty conditional upon the
parent’s information has a simple “variance plus bias” representation:
E[(Xt + at − Ma
t−1)2|X1,...,Xt−1,M] = p−1
X + (M + at − Ma
t−1)2. (3)
Thus, Eqs. (2) and (3) reﬂect the basic tradeoﬀ in this model.
As in the standard learning models we build upon, our agents are Bayesian rational
(i.e. they maximize expected utility). However, our model is set up so that the child’s
learning problem is elementary, and its solution involves a simple adaptive rule. We are
conﬁdent that our main ﬁndings can be generalized to a suitable class of non-Bayesian-
rational adaptive learning rules. On the other hand, we realize that certain aspects of
child development, and hence parenting, are probably best understood in a setting where
computational, memory, or motor constraints (and the evolution thereof) play a central
role. A model that reﬂects these considerations likely requires substantial departures from
Bayesian learning. In any event, adopting a relatively “conservative” modeling approach
has two advantages: ﬁrst, we can rest assured that the decision-theoretic foundations of
our basic models are sound and well-understood; second, and more importantly, insofar as
the conclusions of our analysis deviate from the predictions of standard models, we can be
sure that this can be attributed entirely to expert supervision.
Another limitation is that we do not allow the parent to “describe” or “demonstrate”
how to perform the task at hand. We only model one communication channel between the
parent and the child, namely the former’s intervention in the latter’s learning process. We
7certainly do not wish to suggest that, in actual parent-child interactions, this really is the
only open communication channel, and in fact we brieﬂy discuss the empirical consequences
of one highly stylized model of communication in Section 3.17 We do not even wish to
suggest that we believe it to be the most “interesting.” Rather, the present paper focuses
on one speciﬁc channel that, as the preceding discussion suggests, is important in a variety
of settings. Developing a model of supervised learning that incorporates more “direct”
forms of teaching as well as imitation18 is an intriguing direction for further research.
2.2 Three benchmark parenting policies
Before we analyze the solution to the parent’s problem, it is useful to consider three refer-
ence, or benchmark parenting policies.
Letting Go: at = 0. This is the simplest policy. Clearly, it does not induce any bias in
the child’s learning process.
Full Sheltering: at = Ma
t−1 − M (a.k.a. “The Italian Mom”). Since the parent knows
the value of M, this policy minimizes the per-period loss at times t = 1,...,T: this can be
seen from Eq. (3). Intuitively, recall that the child’s choice at time t is bt = Ma
t−1, and the
loss is (Xt + at − bt): thus, by chooosing at = Ma
t−1 − M, the parent “shifts” the mean of
Xt so that it coincides with the child’s choice. In other words, the parent makes sure that
the child “gets it right” on average. Of course, this has negative consequences in terms of
learning: the child’s belief that Ma
t−1 is the mean of Xt is reinforced, no matter how close
or distant from the true mean M it may be.
The Boot Camp: at =
p0+(t−1)pX
pX (M − Ma
t−1). This policy ensures that, at the end of
time t (i.e. after observing Xt), the child’s posterior Ma
t will be equal to M on average.
Intuitively, we can think of this policy as exacerbating the loss to the child for an incorrect
choice, thereby accelerating learning.
Thus, the present framework allows for a range of qualitatively very diﬀerent parenting
strategies. Moreover, the Full Sheltering and Boot Camp policies will turn out to be useful
reference points to understand the main features of the optimal solution: Full Sheltering
maximizes myopic payoﬀs, whereas the Boot Camp policy maximizes learning.
17Indeed, it is well known at least since the work of Bandura and coauthors [4, 3] that children can
learn by imitating the behavior of others. Furthermore, a stream of literature in developmental psychology,
starting in part with the work of Vygotsky [70], emphasizes the “social” aspects of child development.
Similar considerations are true for animals (see e.g. Zentall and Galef [77].
18See for instance Schlag [66] who provides a bounded rationality model with imitation; see also
Apesteguia et al. [1] for a treatment with theory and experiments.
82.3 Characterization and key features of the Optimal Policy
We can now state our main characterization result:
Theorem 2.1 The optimal action of the parent at time t is a linear function of the child’s
bias: at = γt(Ma
t−1−M). The intensity of intervention γt is time-varying but deterministic,
and lies between zero and one. Also, γt is decreasing in δ and L. Finally, γt is a weighted
average of the intensities of intervention for the “Full Sheltering” and “Boot Camp” policies.
A formal statement and proof of this and all other results are in the Appendix.
The key qualitative conclusion of Theorem 2.1 is the ﬁnding that optimal parenting
entails partial sheltering: the intensity of intervention γt lies in (0,1). This ﬁnding plays a
central role in our analysis of the evidence from behavioral genetics in Sec. 3.
As the discount factor δ increases, and/or the number of unsupervised periods L − T
increases (speciﬁcally, if L increases and T is held ﬁxed), learning the correct value of
M becomes more important for the child. Theorem 2.1 conﬁrms that, in this case, the
intensity of intervention γt decreases.
Finally, the optimal policy is a combination of a parenting strategy that maximizes
learning (the “Boot Camp”) and one that maximizes myopic payoﬀs (“Full Sheltering”).19
In particular, γt = µtγFS
t +(1−µt)γBC
t , where γFS
t = 1, γBC
t = −
p0+(t−1)pX
pX , and µt ∈ (0,1).
The weight µt placed on the “Boot Camp” intensity γBC
t can be shown to reﬂect the relative
cost of the child’s biases in the current and the following periods: µt (and hence γt) will
be higher in periods when the cost of mistakes is high relative to the following period.
Illustration and Interpretation. Figure 1 depicts the intensity of intervention for a range
of parameters, summarized in Table 1. The resulting patterns of parenting behavior are
representative of what our model can generate.
Label Color δ p0 pX Label Color δ p0 pX
1 Red 0.9 1 0.1 4 Brown 0.99 0.1 1
2 Blue 0.9 1 1 5 Magenta 0.99 1 1
3 Green 0.9 0.1 1
Table 1: Parameters for the plots in Fig. 1. L = 100, T = 20.
In addition to the properties highlighted in Theorem 2.1, we draw attention to two key
features related to, respectively, the time evolution of the intensity of intervention and its
dependence on parameters related to ease of learning.
19Thus, every parent is part drill sargeant and part Italian mom.
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Figure 1: Intensity of intervention for diﬀerent values of p0 and pX.
The dynamics of the intensity of intervention can be understood in terms of the
decomposition of γt into a weighted average of the “Boot Camp” and “Full Sheltering”
intensities. It can be shown that, except possibly for the ﬁrst few time periods, the weight
µt placed on the “Full Sheltering” intensity γFS
t will be decreasing in t for δ relatively low
and increasing in t for δ relatively high.
Consider ﬁrst the case of relatively low discount factor; refer to the curves labeled 1,2
and 3 in Fig. 1. Recall ﬁrst that, by Theorem 2.1, the intensity of intervention will be
relatively high at any point in time. Now notice that γFS
t is constant; on the other hand,
since the precision p0 +(t−1)pX of the child’s posterior at time t increases linearly with t,
the coeﬃcient γBC
t becomes more and more negative.20 Since µt is eventually decreasing
in t, the same will be true for γt. To interpret, note that the impact of observations on the
child’s posterior is greater early on (see Eq. (2)), so sheltering in later periods induces a
smaller bias. We conclude that, if δ is low, the parent places less weight on reducing the
child’s bias than on minimizing current losses, and a high, but eventually decreasing level
of sheltering is optimal.
20Intuitively, the child’s posterior is less aﬀected by experience in later periods, and therefore a more
substantial intervention is required in order to correct a given expected bias.
10A symmetric argument applies to the case of relatively high discount factor (curves 4
and 5 in Fig. 1), leading to low, but eventually increasing intensities of intervention. There
is, however, an additional complication: even if the weight placed upon Full Sheltering
increases, the intensity of intervention for the Boot Camp policy decreases linearly. Still,
simulations suggest that the pattern displayed in Fig. 1 is prevalent.
Ease of learning is determined both by the child’s ability to learn and the complexity
of the environment. In our model, these are captured by the relative magnitude of the
precisions p0 and pX. Refer to Eq. (1), which characterizes Bayesian updating of the
estimated mean of Xt: if p0 is high, or if pX is low, the child places more weight on her
prior M0 than on observations, and hence learning occurs more slowly.
Our analysis identiﬁes two eﬀects of the ease of learning on the intensity of intervention.
The ﬁrst is straightforward: if learning occurs more slowly, the child beneﬁts less from a
reduced bias; thus, there is an incentive to provide more sheltering, i.e. increase γt, when
learning is harder. We call this the “inertia” eﬀect.
There is, however, a more subtle intertemporal eﬀect, pushing in the opposite direction.
If learning is harder, this will be the case not just today, but also in the future; in other
words, the “cost” (continuation value) of the residual bias at the end of the current period
is higher when learning is harder. Thus, there is an incentive to provide less sheltering, i.e.
decrease γt, when learning is harder. We call this the “continuation value” eﬀect.
We have veriﬁed (via numerical analysis) that the inertia eﬀect dominates when the
discount factor is low, whereas the continuation-value eﬀect can prevail when δ is high.
3 Nature and Nurture: Interpreting evidence from behav-
ioral genetics
3.1 A Population Model
In order to analyze the interaction between genetic eﬀects and parenting, we embed our
simple, two-agent supervised-learning model within a population framework where parents
and children are heterogeneous.
We continue to assume that the correct way to perform a task is represented by the
real number M. We also continue to assume that every child has a normal prior over M.
The dimension of heterogeneity we explore is the simplest one to analyze in our model:
we assume that a distribution of prior means M0 in the population of children is given.
Formally, we now treat M0 as a random variable.
Symmetrically, we assume that parents do not observe M, and have a normal prior on
it, with mean Z0 and precision pZ0. Furthermore, a distribution of the prior mean Z0 in
11the population of parents is given: thus, Z0 is also treated as a random variable.
Because M is the same for everyone in the population, the heterogeneity in priors,
and in the corresponding posteriors, has payoﬀ consequences, and can be interpreted as a
a ﬁtness measure: agents who are closer to the true mean, namely, those who are more
correct on average, are better oﬀ because they make better decisions.
The exact distribution of M0 and Z0 is not important. We do, however, make a few
assumptions relating the key uncertain quantities in the model.
First, to aid in the interpretation of this model, it is useful to think of the parent’s
prior beliefs N(Z0,pZ0) as coming from (1) some prior belief that the parent held when she
was born as a child, and (2) subsequent experience acquired as the parent was growing up.
We also imagine that the distribution of the beliefs held by the parent as she was born as
a child is the same as the distribution of the current child’s beliefs. We shall elaborate on
this point in Sec. 3.3.
We also assume that children’s and parents’ prior means are uncorrelated with the
observations.
Whenever we consider more than one parent and/or more than one child, these as-
sumptions will apply to each child-parent pair and to the observations made by the child
in that pair. Observations made by diﬀerent children will be assumed to be conditionally
independent.
The correlations between two individuals’ prior means play a crucial role in our anal-
ysis. Speciﬁcally, these correlations reﬂect the genetic relatedness of the individuals under
consideration. Thus, for instance, the prior means of unrelated parents, or of parents
and adoptive children, are uncorrelated; the prior means of dizygotic twins are perfectly
correlated; and so on.21
An important feature of the linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework adopted here is that,
even if parents do not know M, the optimal policy has the same structure as in Theorem 2.1;
in particular, the intensity of intervention γt is the same as in the model of the previous
section. The only diﬀerence is that, at each time t, M is replaced with its conditional
expected value at that time, given the parent’s prior mean Z0 and the realizations of the
signals X1,...,Xt.
21We note that there may be some ambiguity as to the interpretation of the term ‘parent.’ We typically
mean some aggregate of the two parents, which reﬂects the extent to which child-rearing responsibilities
are shared within the family. This only matters when quantifying the genetic relatedness of a child and his
biological ‘parent.’ However, we do not need to take a stand on the precise values here; all we need is that
the child have substantial (but not perfect) genetic relatedness with his biological ‘parent.’
123.2 Behavioral Genetics: the ACE model
As was noted in the Introduction, the literature on behavioral genetics (BG henceforth)
empasizes the central role of an individual’s genes in determining a variety of traits such as
IQ or, more broadly, cognitive achievement. To interpret and provide a rationale for their
conclusions, behavioral geneticists typically adopt the so-called “ACE model”; we shall
now discuss a widely-used, if simple variant (cf. Plomin, DeFries, McClearn and McGuﬃn
[55], p. 345 ﬀ.).
The ﬁrst step is to decompose the observable characteristic of interest, or phenotype,
into a sum of three factors: the individual’s genotype, or genetic endowment; the shared
environment, corresponding to factors that aﬀect siblings reared in the same family; and
the non-shared environment, which captures idiosyncratic elements of the phenotype. The
random variables corresponding to the phenotype and the three factors just described are
commonly denoted by P, A, C and E respectively; the reference equation of the ACE
model can then be written as
P = A + C + E. (4)
The typical assumption in the ACE model is that the factors aﬀecting a given individual’s
phenotype are mutually independent.22 Consequently, the variance of P equals the sum of
the variances of the three factors A, C and E.
It should be emphasized that the additive formulation in Eq. (4) does not follow from,
or even suggest, an explicit biological–developmental “production function” whereby ge-
netic and environmental inputs are transformed into behavioral outputs. Indeed, in the
words of Goldberger [39], the factors A, C and E are themselves best viewed as “hypo-
thetical constructs.”
By way of contrast, our model suggests a linear relationship whose terms have a direct
interpretation in our framework. Speciﬁcally, consider for simplicity a two-period version
of the model in Sec. 2; the parent is active only in the ﬁrst. We can interpret the child’s
posterior at time 1, i.e. M1, as her phenotype. The form of the optimal parenting policy
provided by Theorem 2.1 enable us to express the phenotype M1 as a function of the
primitive parameters of our model, as well as the intensity of intervention γ1. Speciﬁcally,
we write
M1 |{z}
P
=
p0
p0 + pX
M0
| {z }
A
+γ1
pX
p0 + pX
(M0 − Z0)
| {z }
C
+
pX
p0 + pX
X1
| {z }
E
, (5)
where we have emphasized a possible mapping between the key quantities in our framework
and the additive factors in the ACE model. The terms corresponding to A and E have
22There are a few notable exceptions: e.g. REFS Flynn...
13been chosen to be purely genetic and, respectively, purely environmental and non-shared
respectively; the remaining term captures the eﬀects of parenting, and corresponds to the
factor C in the ACE model.23 Eq. (5) will provide the basis for the analysis in the following
two subsections.
3.3 Evidence from Twin Studies
One simple approach to evaluate the relative importance of genes and common rearing
in determining cognitive and behavioral traits entails computing the correlation between
measured characteristics of the two members of a twin pair (“phenotypic correlation”),
and comparing these correlations across distinct categories of twins that diﬀer by genetic
similarity and/or rearing.
For instance, for most traits of interest, the phenotypic correlation for monozygotic
(identical; MZ henceforth) twins reared apart, by diﬀerent adoptive parents, is not signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than for MZ twins reared together, by their biological parents. Speciﬁcally,
in most studies, the phenotypic correlation for MZ twins reared apart, denoted rMZA, is at
least 90% of the phenotypic correlation for MZ twins reared together, denoted rMZT. In
fact, for certain traits, phenotypic correlation is actually higher for twins raised apart than
for twins raised together (Bouchard [19], Tab. 4).
Furthermore, the diﬀerence between rMZT and rMZA is considerably smaller than that
between the phenotypic correlations for MZ and dizygotic (fraternal; DZ henceforth) twins
reared together.
In the BG literature, these ﬁndings are interpreted as indicating that common rear-
ing plays a minor role in determining the traits of interest. Intuitively, if genotype and
environmental factors are independent, the phenotypic correlation between twins reared
together is determined both by their common genetic endowment, and by their common
rearing (the non-shared environment is, by deﬁnition, unique to each child); on the other
hand, for twins reared apart, phenotypic correlation can only be driven by commonality in
their genetic endowment. Thus, if rMZA is not much smaller than rMZT, the contribution
of common rearing to phenotypic correlation must be small. Similarly, MZ and DZ twins
reared together share the same rearing environment; taking the diﬀerence between their
respective phenotypic correlations “cancels out” the common eﬀects of parenting, so any re-
maining diﬀerence must be due to the fact that MZ twins have the same genetic endowment,
whereas DZ twins only share 50% of the genes. Therefore, if rMZT −rMZA < rMZT −rDZT,
reducing genetic commonality between twins has a greater eﬀect on phenotypic correlation
23An alternative to the proposed mapping is to let A =
p0+γ1pX
p0+pX M0, leave E unchanged, and adjust C
accordingly. This would only require minor alterations in the following discussion; the main conclusions of
our analysis would be, of course, unchanged.
14than rearing them in separate families. As shown in Appendix A.3, this intuition can be
formalized in the ACE model—although it should be noted that the latter cannot explain
the ﬁnding that rMZA > rMZT for certain traits.
We shall now show that these same patterns of phenotypic correlations arise in our
model of supervised learning, precisely because of key features of the optimal parenting pol-
icy. Therefore, the conclusion that family inﬂuence is limited is not necessarily warranted—
in our model, the above correlational patterns are consistent with signiﬁcant parental input.
3.4 Phenotypic Correlations under Supervised Learning
Note ﬁrst that Eq. (5) may be used to compute phenotypic correlations for all twin
categories mentioned in the preceding discussion. Throughout this Section, it is convenient
to deﬁne p =
pX
p0+pX, which corresponds to the precision of the observation Xt as a fraction
of the precision of the child’s posterior M1. We also denote by v0 and vZ0 the population
variances of M0 and Z0 respectively; by v1 and v1a the variances of M1 for children reared
by their biological parents and by adopted parents respectively (as we elaborate in §3.5
below, these will be diﬀerent in our model); and by vX = 1
pX the variance of Xt. Finally, let
r0 denote the correlation between M0 and Z0 (for a child reared by her biological parents).
We show in Appendix A.4 that
rMZT − rMZA = [pγ1]2vZ0
v1
− r0

2
vX + γ2
1vZ0
v1a
[(1 − p) + pγ1]p3γ1
√
v0vZ0
v1

, (6)
rMZT − rDZT =
1
2
[(1 − p) + pγ1]2v0
v1
. (7)
It is useful to focus on Eq. (6). We emphasize a key qualitative feature: the correlation
r0 between the child’s prior M0 and her biological parent’s initial mean Z0 enters with a
negative sign in Eq. (6), and hence reduces the diﬀerence in phenotypic correlation between
MZ twins reared together and reared apart. As a result, the diﬀerence rMZT − rMZA may
well be very small, and even negative.
This eﬀect is the main force that enables our model of supervised learning to generate
the correlational patterns discussed above. Indeed, as we shall demonstrate momentarily,
the above correlational patterns emerge for a broad range of sensible parameterizations.
However, we ﬁrst discuss the intuition behind the negative eﬀect of r0 on the diﬀerence in
phenotypic correlation.
Each twin raised by adoptive parents is likely to be less similar to her parent than if
she was raised by her biological parent. On average, this will lead adoptive parents to
provide more sheltering. This is consistent with evidence from a variety of sources. For
instance, Hoopes [46] ﬁnds that “adoptive mothers are more protective and careful with
15the children... adoptive mothers and fathers reported that they fostered more dependency
than the biological fathers and mothers. The latter group admitted to greater feelings
of irritability regarding their children, and the fathers tended to force independence, sup-
press aﬀection, and accelerate development (p.23).” Furthermore, these more protective
attitudes of adoptive parents “may have their eﬀect on the children, who, at 5 years of
age, were rated as a little less conﬁdent and less willing and attentive in task completion
(p.27).” Warren [73] shows that “adoption signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood of referral
for psychiatric treatment, even after controlling for the fact that adoptees are signiﬁcantly
more likely to be referred when they display few problems.”
But this means that non-shared environmental inﬂuences will have fewer opportunities
to aﬀect the twins’ posterior, which, as a result, will be more similar to their prior, and
hence more similar to one another on average. Conversely, twins raised by their biological
parents will be subject to less sheltering, because their priors are positively correlated with
their parents’. Hence, their non-shared experiences will have a greater role, and they will
end up being less similar to one another.
Thus, diﬀerential sheltering by biological and adoptive parents provides a countervailing
force to common rearing;24 this is captured in Eq. (6) by the negative coeﬃcient of r0.
It should be clear that sheltering plays a crucial role in the mechanism just described.
For instance, consider a variant of the model developed in this paper in which parents
simply communicate their prior mean Z0 to children, but do not intervene in their learning
process. Such a model would diﬀer from the reference ACE framework because shared
environmental factors are correlated with the child’s genes. Yet, such a model would be
unable to match the empirical ﬁnding that, for certain traits, rMZA > rMZT. Furthermore,
to account for the other correlational patterns described above, one would need to assume
that the communication technology is considerably noisy (or, equivalently, that children
do not place much weight on what their parents tell them). But, in a model of this kind,
this would be tantamount to assuming directly that parents have limited inﬂuence on their
children.
On the other hand, we can think of other models that generate analogous countervailing
forces through diﬀerent means. For instance, we could obtain similar eﬀects if we assumed
that intervention by parents is solely driven by a desire to have their children be similar
to them.25 Under this assumption, because the biological parents are more similar to their
children than the adoptive parents, the latter intervene more intensely, thus generating
24The fact that common rearing increases phenotypic correlation for twins reared together, and hence
the diﬀerence between r
MZT and r
MZA, is captured by the positive coeﬃcient on vZ0, the variance of the
parent’s prior; see also Eq. (23) in Appendix A.4.
25Bisin and Verdier [13, 14] make such an assumption in a model of cultural transmission.
16similar eﬀects to those discussed above.
We ﬁnally demonstrate in Figure 2 below that the correlational patterns described in
the preceding subsection emerge for a broad range of parameters. In particular, to rule
out implausible parameterizations,26 we consider a “steady-state” version of our model. In
every period, parents are explicitly modeled as individuals who were born at the beginning
of the previous period with some prior beliefs, which they subsequently revised in light of
observations made under the supervision of their own parents. This enables us to write
the parent’s initial mean Z0 in a form analogous to Eq. (5), and compute its variance vZ0
and correlation r0 with M0 (for twins reared by their biological parents) as functions of
the remaining parameters. Appendix A.4 provides the details.
We set δ = (0.95)20, intuitively suggesting a 95% yearly discount factor and a teaching
period lasting for 20 years (higher values of δ lead to even greater prevalence of the above
correlational patterns).
Since the coeﬃcient of intervention γ1 is itself a function of p =
pX
p0+pX and δ, it is
suﬃcient to specify values p, v0 and the variance vX of Xt in addition to δ to obtain a
full parameterization of our model. Finally, Eqs. (6) and (7) indicate that phenotypic
correlations are unaﬀected by a common rescaling of all variances; hence, we can focus on
only two parameters, namely p and the ratio of v0 to vX. Figure 2 depicts the former on
the vertical axis and the latter on the horizontal axis.
Every point below the topmost curve corresponds to a parameterization for which
rMZT − rMZA is smaller than rMZT − rDZT. The second curve from the top is the upper
bound of the region where rMZA is more than 90% of rMZT, and the one immediately below
it demarcates the region where rMZA is more than 95% of rMZT. Finally, the oval-shaped
region bounded by the last two curves corresponds to parameter values for which rMZA is
actually greater than rMZT.
Two main conclusions can be drawn by inspecting Fig. 2. First of all, as noted above,
for a substantial range of parameter values, our model generates correlational patterns that
the BG literature has interpreted as indicating limited parental inﬂuence on developmental
outcomes—despite the fact that our model accords a fundamental role to parents.
Second, our setup provides a richer framework than the benchmark ACE model to
interpret ﬁndings from twin and adoption studies. For instance, suppose that p is greater
than 1
2, indicating a relatively higher weight of experience in the child’s learning process—
and, therefore, a relatively limited contribution of genetic factors to the phenotype. As Fig.
2 shows, whether, for instance, rMZT −rMZA is smaller or larger than rMZT −rDZT actually
26For instance, we wish to rule out the possibility that Z0 may be non-random, because this would be
inconsistent with the assumption that this quantity is itself determined by the parent’s prior at “time −1”
and subsequent (supervised) learning.
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depends upon the relative magnitude of the variances v0 and vX. If the environment is
relatively homogeneous in the population under consideration (i.e. vX is small relative to
v0), then our model predicts that rMZT − rMZA < rMZT − rDZT. Behavioral geneticists
would interpret this as indicating that genetic factors are determinant; however, our model
suggests that this pattern may instead be entirely due to the relative homogeneity of the
environment.
In this respect, our model formalizes an objection to the BG interpretation of correla-
tional ﬁndings that other researchers have voiced; for instance, see Ridley [58, pp. 86-87].
Moreover, it also qualiﬁes this objection: if p is small, so that the child’s genetically-
determined prior has a large weight, then the homogeneity of the environment does not
matter: the same correlation patterns will emerge.
3.5 Diﬀerences in Phenotypic Variance
The observation that adoptive parents provide more sheltering has a further empirical
implication in our model: the ability of adopted children to perform the task under consid-
eration is more dispersed—that is, the variance of the posterior mean is larger for adopted
children. This is because adopted children are less exposed to non-shared experiences, and
hence don’t learn the correct way to perform the task at hand as fast as children reared
by their biological parents.
18Formally, the analysis in the Appendix shows that the variance of the posterior for a
child reared by her biological parents, v1, and for a child reared by adoptive parents, v1a,
satisfy
v1 = v1a − 2[(1 − p) + pγ1]pγ1Cov[M0,Z0],
where M0 and Z0 refer to a child and her biological parent respectively. The covariance
term is multiplied by a negative constant, because γ1 ∈ (0,1); this delivers the required
conclusion.
However, it is important to point out that this is a statement about the variance of
posterior means, not their population average. In fact, Eq. (5) implies that the average
posterior mean will be the same for adopted and biological children. This is a consequence
of the linearity of the parent’s optimal policy.
3.6 Heritability Estimates
Within the framework of the ACE model, a key quantity of interest is heritability, deﬁned
as the ratio
Var[A]
Var[P]
≡ h2. (8)
Heritability is intended to capture the extent of variation in the observable trait of interest
that can be ascribed to variation in the genes. As an example, for several measures of
IQ, Bouchard [19] reports values of heritability ranging from 69% to 78%. Other studies
have broadly conﬁrmed this ﬁnding. According to the above interpretation, these ﬁgure
suggest that IQ is, to a large extent, genetically determined. It should be noted that the
interpretation of heritability adopted in BG is subject to a number of qualiﬁcations (see
e.g. Goldberger [39]); nevertheless, heritability remains a central quantity of interest in
BG, and one that is often invoked in various instances of the nature-nurture debate.
One common measure of heritability is the correlation in the measured trait under
consideration for MZ twins raised apart. The intuition suggested by behavioral geneticists
is that, due to their being reared in diﬀerent families and, more broadly, environments,
such individuals can only be alike to the extent that their genetic endowment (which is
identical) inﬂuences the measure of interest.
Another commmon measure of heritability is the diﬀerence between the correlations in a
measured trait of interest for MZ and DZ twins reared by their biological parents, multiplied
by two. The suggested intuition is that taking the diﬀerence between these correlations
“cancels out” any (additive) eﬀect of common rearing and, more broadly, environmental
factors on the trait of interest, thus identifying purely genetic eﬀects. One advantage of
this approach relative to the one involving adopted twins is the availability of considerably
larger samples. The ﬁndings are broadly in line with those reported above.
19In the Appendix we verify that the above intuitive considerations can be made rigorous
in the ACE model, but require crucial independence assumptions.
In our model, as shown in the Appendix,
rMZA = 2(rMZT − rDZT) = [(1 − p) + pγ1]
2 h2.
Since γ1 > 0, it follows that standard measures of heritability underestimate the eﬀects of
parenting on the trait of interest.
Slightly rephrasing, standard calculations in BG can be seen as capturing a broad
notion of heritability, reﬂecting both the direct impact of genes on the phenotype, as well
as their indirect impact, mediated by parenting. However, even comparatively large values
of “broad heritability” do not provide any rationale for negating a signiﬁcant role for
parenting as a contributor to developmental outcomes.
4 Concluding Remarks
TO BE REWRITTEN
No direct communication. As noted in the Introduction, we do not model direct com-
munication between the parent and the child, because we wish to focus speciﬁcally on
supervised learning-by-doing.
One way to construct a model that incorporates both aspects of parent/child interaction
in a textbook-equilibrium setting is to assume that the parent’s objective function does
not coincide with that of the child, and introduce a round of cheap talk before supervised
learning begins. For a simple speciﬁcation, continue to assume that the child’s loss at time
t is (Xt+at−bt)2, and suppose that the parent’s loss is (Xt+at+D−bt)2. The parameter
D ∈ R can be interpreted as an intrinsic diﬀerence between the child’s and the parent’s
preferred way to perform the task at hand, which is distinct from the child’s informational
bias M0 − M.
The analysis and results in this section can be easily adapted to this model; the same
is true of our characterization of textbook-equilibrium behavior in Sec. C.3. If we now
add one round of cheap talk, the analysis of Crawford and Sobel [30] implies that full
information revelation will not obtain in equilibrium. Thus, there will be scope for both
verbal communication (cheap talk) and supervised learning.
20A Appendix
A.1 Main Result
It is convenient to let pt = p0 + tpX for t = 0,...,L. Also, to track the child’s conditional
expectation, deﬁne the random variable
Ma
t =



p0M0+pX
Pt
s=1[Xs+as(M,X1,...,Xt−1)]
pt t ≤ T
p0M0+pX
PT
s=1[Xs+as(M,X1,...,Xt−1)]+pX
Pt
s=T+1 Xs
pt t > T
(9)
The formal statement of Theorem 2.1 is as follows:
Theorem A.1 The optimal parenting policy a = (a1,...,aT) ∈ A is
at = γt(Ma
t−1 − M), (10)
where γt =
1 − δBt+1
pX
pt
pt−1
pt
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2, BT+1 =
L−T X
τ=1
δτ−1

pT
pT+τ−1
2
, Bt =
δBt+1
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2. (11)
Furthermore, γt ∈ (0,1) and γt is decreasing in δ and L. Finally, for t = 1,...,T,
γt = µtγFS
t + (1 − µt)γBC
t , where µt =
Bt
δBt+1
∈ (0,1), γFS
t = 1, γBC
t = −
pt−1
pX
.
Proof. The fact that γt is decreasing in δ and L follows from a simple induction argument, by
inspecting Eq. (11).
Henceforth, we let a = (a1,...,aT) ∈ A denote the parent’s optimal policy; also, to simplify
the notation, we write Ma
t−1 simply as Mt−1. Thus, by the arguments given in the text, at each
time t, the child’s optimal action is bt = Mt−1.
Begin by analyzing the non-teaching periods. To this end, observe ﬁrst that, from Eq. (9), for
all t ≥ T and τ ≥ 0,
Mt+τ =
1
pt+τ
 
ptMt + pX
t+τ X
s=t+1
Xs
!
, (12)
where, as is customary, for τ = 0, the empty summation is assumed to equal zero. Hence, for t ≥ T
and τ ≥ 1,
Xt+τ − Mt+τ−1 = Xt+τ −
pt
pt+τ−1
Mt −
pX
pt+τ−1
t+τ−1 X
s=t+1
Xs = (13)
= (Xt+τ − M) −
pt
pt+τ−1
(Mt − M) −
pX
pt+τ−1
t+τ−1 X
s=t+1
(Xs − M);
the last line uses the fact that ptM + pX
Pt+τ−1
s=t+1 M = ptM + pX(τ − 1)M = pt+τ−1M. It now
follows that, at any time t ≥ T, and for all τ ≥ 1, from the point of view of the parent, i.e.
21conditional upon the realization of M, the expected loss at time t + τ given the observed value of
Mt is
E[(Xt+τ − Mt+τ−1)2|M,Mt] =
1
pX
+
p2
X
p2
t+τ−1
(τ − 1)
1
pX
+
p2
t
p2
t+τ−1
(Mt − M)2;
this follows from the assumption that X1,...,XL are i.i.d. normal with mean M and precision
pX conditional on M,27 which in turn implies that all of the cross-terms, which are of the form
(Xt+τ −M)(Mt−M), (Xt+τ −M)(Xs−M) and (Mt−M)(Xs−M) for s ∈ {t+1,...,t+τ−1}, and
(Xs −M)(Xσ −M) for s,σ distinct in {t+1,...,t+τ −1}, all have zero conditional expectation.
It follows that, for every non-teaching period t + 1 ∈ {T + 1,...,L}, conditional upon M and
Mt, the expected time-(t + 1) continuation value of the child’s optimal policy is Vt+1(Mt,M) =
At+1 + Bt+1(Mt − M)2, where28
At+1 =
L−t X
τ=1
δτ−1

1
pX
+
pX
p2
t+τ−1
(τ − 1)

, Bt+1 =
L−t X
τ=1
δτ−1

pt
pt+τ−1
2
. (14)
Turn now to teaching periods t ∈ {1,...,T}. From the argument just given, VT+1(MT,M) =
AT + BT+1(MT − M)2. We now show inductively that, for t = T,...,1, if Vt+1(Mt,M) = At+1 +
Bt+1(Mt−M)2, then the equations for at and γt in Thm. 2.1 hold, and furthermore Vt(Mt−1,M) =
At + Bt(Mt−1 − M)2, where Bt is again as in Thm. 2.1.
Notice that, again from Eq. (9), for every t ≤ T,
Mt =
p0
pt
M0 +
pX
pt
t X
s=1
(Xs + as) =
pt−1
pt
Mt−1 +
pX
pt
(Xt + at). (15)
After substituting for Mt in the expression for Vt+1 in the inductive hypothesis, conditional on the
information It ≡ {M,X1,...,Xt−1}, the action at must solve the Bellman equation
Vt(Mt−1,M) = min
¯ a E

(Xt + ¯ a − Mt−1)2|It

+ (16)
+ δE
"
At+1 + Bt+1

pt−1
pt
Mt−1 +
pX
pt
(Xt + ¯ a) − M
2
|It
#
.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to ¯ a, taking expectations, and dividing by 2 yields the FOC
0 = ¯ a − (Mt−1 − M) + δBt+1

pt−1
pt
Mt−1 +
pX
pt
(M + a) − M

pX
pt
and therefore
at =
1 − δBt+1
pXpt−1
p2
t
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2 · (Mt−1 − M) ≡ γt(Mt−1 − M). (17)
27Strictly speaking, since the parent knows M, in her view this is the actual unconditional distribution
of the Xs’s; for the child, M is a r.v., so the above statement describes the conditional distribution of the
Xs’s given M. However, we use a more explicit terminology and notation to remind the reader that M can
be treated as a constant in the above expectations.
28For the purposes of solving for the optimal policy, we only need an expression for VT+1. However, the
expression for Bt, t = T + 1,...,L is used below to show that γt ∈ (0,1) in the scalar case.
22We now show that Vt can be expressed as a quadratic form in (Mt−1 − M). First, to simplify
the quadratic form in the ﬁrst line of Eq. (16), observe that
Xt + γt(Mt−1 − M) − Mt−1 = (Xt − M) − (1 − γt)(Mt−1 − M);
as for the quadratic form in the second line of Eq. (16),
pt−1
pt
Mt−1 +
pX
pt
(Xt + γt(Mt−1 − M)) − M =
=
pt−1
pt
(Mt−1 − M) +
pX
pt
(Xt − M + γt(Mt−1 − M)) =
=
pt−1 + pXγt
pt
(Mt−1 − M) +
pX
pt
(Xt − M).
Therefore Vt(Mt−1,M) = At + Bt(Mt−1 − M)2, where At is a suitable constant and
Bt = (1 − γt)2 + δBt+1

pt−1 + pXγt
pt
2
. (18)
To show that Bt can be written as in Eq. (11), note that
1 − γt =
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2
− 1 + δBt+1
pXpt−1
p2
t
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2 =
δBt+1
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2
pX
pt
(19)
and, similarly,
pt−1 + γtpX
pt
=
1
pt
pt−1 + pt−1δBt+1

pX
pt
2
+ pX − pXδBt+1
pXpt−1
p2
t
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2 =
1
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2. (20)
Hence, as required,
Bt =
(δBt+1)2

pX
pt
2
+ δBt+1

1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
22 =
δBt+1
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2.
We now show that γt ∈ (0,1) for t = 1,...,T. It is clear that γt < 1, so we must only verify
that γt > 0. Notice ﬁrst that, from Eq. (14), for t = T + 1,...,L − 1,
Bt =
L−(t−1) X
τ=1
δτ−1

pt−1
pt+τ−2
2
=

pt−1
pt−1
2
+
L−(t−1) X
τ=2
δτ−1

pt−1
pt+τ−2
2
=
= 1 + δ
L−t X
τ=1
δτ−1

pt−1
pt+τ−1
2
= 1 + δ

pt−1
pt
2 L−t X
τ=1
δτ−1

pt
pt+τ−1
2
=
= 1 + δ

pt−1
pt
2
Bt+1;
23also, BL = 1. Furthermore, we claim that Bt+1
pX
pt
pt−1
pt < 1 for all t < L. The claim is true
for t = L − 1, because BL = 1 and pt = pX + pt−1 for all t ≥ 1. Now consider an arbitrary
t ∈ {T + 1,...,L} and assume the claim is true for t + 1,...,L. Now Bt
pX
pt−1
pt−2
pt−1 =
pX
pt−1
pt−2
pt−1 +
δBt+1

pt−1
pt
2
pX
pt−1
pt−2
pt−1 =
pX
pt−1
pt−2
pt−1 + δBt+1
pX
pt
pt−1
pt ·
pt−1
pt−1
pt−2
pt−1 ≤
pX
pt−1 + δBt+1
pX
pt
pt−1
pt ·
pt−2
pt−1 < 1.
Hence, in particular, δBT+1
pX
pT
pT−1
pT < 1, and so γT ∈ (0,1). If T = 1, we are done. Otherwise,
argue by induction; consider t ∈ {1,...,T} and assume that the claim is true for t + 1. By
Eqs. (19) and (11), Bt+1 = (1 − γt+1)
pt+1
pX , so Bt+1
pX
pt
pt−1
pt = (1 − γt+1)
pt+1
pX
pX
pt
pt−1
pt = (1 −
γt+1)
(pt+pX)(pt−pX)
p2
t = (1−γt+1)
p
2
t−p
2
X
p2
t = (1−γt+1)

1 −
p
2
X
p2
t

< (1−γt+1), because pt = p0+tpX ≥
p0 +pX for t ≥ 1. By the induction hypothesis, 1−γt+1 ∈ (0,1), so Bt+1
pX
pt
pt−1
pt < 1 and therefore
γt ∈ (0,1), as claimed.
Finally, we show that γt can be decomposed as a weighted average of γFS
t and γBC
t . We have
γt =
1 − δBt+1
pX
pt
pt−1
pt
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2 =
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2 
−
pt−1
pX

1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2 =
=
1
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2 · 1 +
δBt+1

pX
pt
2
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2 ·

−
pt−1
pX

=
≡ µtγFS
t + (1 − µt)γBC
t ,
and Eq. (11) implies that
µt =
1
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2 =
Bt
δBt+1
.
which clearly lies in (0,1).
A.2 Time pattern of µt
Proposition A.2 In the setting of Theorem 2.1, for every T0 ∈ {1,...,T}:
1. δ <

pT0
pT0+1
2
implies µt > µt+1 for all t = T0,...,T − 1.
2. There exists δ(T0) ∈ (0,1) such that δ > δ(T0) implies µt < µt+1 for all t = T0,...,T − 1;
furthermore, δ(t) ≤ δ(t + 1) for all t = 1,...,T − 1.
Proof. For the ﬁrst claim, recall that µt = 1
1+δBt+1(
pX
pt )
2 and
Bt+1

pX
pt
2
=

pt+1
pt
2 δ
1 + δBt+2

pX
pt+1
2Bt+2

pX
pt+1
2
;
Clearly, if δ <

pT0
pT0+1
2
, then BT0+1

pX
pT0
2
< BT0+2

pX
pT0+1
2
and so µT0 < µT0+1; since
pt
pt+1 is
increasing in t, we have µt > µt+1 for all t = T0,...,T, as required.
24For the second claim, recall from Eq. (18) that
Bt+1 = (1 − γt+1)2 + δBt+2

pt + γt+1pX
pt+1
2
.
Multiplying both sides by

pX
pt
2
and expanding the square in the second term in the rhs yields
Bt+1

pX
pt
2
= (1−γt+1)2

pX
pt
2
+δBt+2

pX
pt+1
2
+δBt+2

pX
pt
2 "
γt+1pX
pt+1
2
+

2ptγt+1pX
pt+1
#
.
Now observe that, by Eq. (11), γt+1 ∈ (0,1) also for δ = 1. Hence, the above equation shows that,
for δ = 1, Bt+1

pX
pt
2
> Bt+2

pX
pt+1
2
, and hence also µt < µt+1. Since both sides of the latter
equation are continuous in δ, there is δt ∈ [0,1) such that δ > δt implies µt < µt+1. Now take
δ(T0) = min{δT0,δT0+1,...,δT} to obtain a cutoﬀ with the required properties.
A.3 Correlations and Heritability in the ACE model
This subsection is based on Plomin et al. [55] (see also Goldberger [39]).
Notation: the variables for members of a twin pair are denoted by P,A,C,E and P0,A0,C0,E0
respectively. If X and Y denote any of these variables, denote by vX the variance of X and by rXY
the correlation between X and Y .
If genetype, shared envoronment, and non-shared environment are mutually independent and
identically distributed across twins, so that vA = vA0, etc., then clearly
vP = vP 0 = vA + vC + vE = vA0 + vC0 + vE0,
regardless of zygosity or rearing conditions. Furthermore, in general,
rPP 0 = rAA0
vA
vP
+ rCC0
vC
vP
+ rEE0
vE
vP
.
Now, by deﬁnition, the non-shared environmental factors are uncorrelated across twins, so
rEE0 = 0. MZ twins share the same genetic endowment, so A = A0 and rAA0 = 1; DZ twins share
only half of the genes, so rAA0 = 1
2. Finally, twins reared together by deﬁnition share the same
“common environment,” so rCC0 = 1 for these twins; on the other hand, for twins reared apart,
rCC0 = 0. Recalling that h2 = vA
vP and similarly deﬁning c2 = vC
vP , we have
rMZT = h2 + c2, rMZA = h2, rDZT =
1
2
h2 + c2.
It is now immediate to see that, as we claim in the text:
1. rMZT − rMZA = c2 captures the eﬀect of common rearing on phenotypic correlation; notice
that this quantity must necessarily be positive;
2. rMZT − rMZA < rMZT − rDZT iﬀ c2 < 1
2h2, i.e. this inequality indicates that genes matter
more than twice as much as commor rearing; and ﬁnally
3. 2

rMZT − rDZT
= rMZA = h2 yields an estimate of heritability.
25A.4 Supervised Learning and Twin Correlations
Throughout this subsection, we continue to let p =
pX
p0+pX as in §3.4. We begin by calculating
phenotypic variance for children reared by their biological parents: from Eq. (5), since X1 is
uncorrelated with M0 and Z0, we get
v1 = [(1 − p) + pγ1]2v0 + p2vX + [pγ1]2vZ0 − 2p(1 − p)r0
√
v0vZ0. (21)
For children reared by adoptive parents, the correlation of M0 and Z0 is zero, so
v1a = [(1 − p) + pγ1]2v0 + p2vX + [pγ1]2vZ0. (22)
We now turn to correlations. Let M1 and M0
1 be the posterior of two twins. For MZ twins
reared together, Eq. (5) yields M1 = [(1−p)+pγ1]M0−pγ1Z0+pX1 and M0
1 = [(1−p)+pγ1]M0−
pγ1Z0 + pX0
1, reﬂecting the fact that these individuals have the same genetic endowment and the
same parents. It follows that
rMZT = [(1 − p) + pγ1]2v0
v1
+ [pγ1]2vZ0
v1
− 2[(1 − p) + pγ1]pγ1r0
√
v0vZ0
v1
. (23)
For DZ twins reared together, we have M1 = [(1−p)+pγ1]M0 −pγ1Z0 +pX1 and M0
1 = [(1−p)+
pγ1]M0
0−pγ1Z0+pX0
1, reﬂecting the fact that these individuals share the same parents; their genetic
endowment is now diﬀerent but biological considerations suggest that the correlation between M0
and M0
0 is 1
2. Therefore,
rDZT =
1
2
[(1 − p) + pγ1]2v0
v1
+ [pγ1]2vZ0
v1
− 2[(1 − p) + pγ1]pγ1r0
√
v0vZ0
v1
, (24)
which, together with Eq. (23, immediately yields Eq. (7) in the text. Finally, for MZ twins reared
apart, we have M1 = [(1−p)+pγ1]M0 −pγ1Z0 +pX1 and M0
1 = [(1−p)+pγ1]M0 −pγ1Z0
0 +pX0
1,
reﬂecting the fact that these individuals have the same genetic endowment, but diﬀerent parents.
Furthermore, if parents are independently drawn from the population of interest, the correlation of
Z0 and Z0
0 is zero, and so
rMZA = [(1 − p) + pγ1]2 v0
v1a
. (25)
We now have
rMZT − rMZA = [(1 − p) + pγ1]2

v0
v1
−
v0
v1a

+ [pγ1]2vZ0
v1
− 2[(1 − p) + pγ1]pγ1r0
√
v0vZ0
v1
=
= [(1 − p) + pγ1]2v0
v1a − v1
v1v1a
+ [pγ1]2vZ0
v1
− 2[(1 − p) + pγ1]pγ1r0
√
v0vZ0
v1
=
= −

1 − [(1 − p) + pγ1]2 v0
v1a

2[(1 − p) + pγ1]pγ1r0
√
v0vZ0
v1
+ [pγ1]2vZ0
v1
=
= −2
vX + γ2
1vZ0
v1a
[(1 − p) + pγ1]p3γ1r0
√
v0vZ0
v1
+ [pγ1]2vZ0
v1
which is Eq. (6); the penultimate step follows from v1a − v1 = 2[(1 − p) + pγ1]pγ1r0
√
v0vZ0, and
the last step from Eq. (22).
26Finally, we describe the steady-state model we used to generate Fig. 2. We shall ﬁrst compute
Z0 as the posterior of an individual with prior M−1, who learns from the observation of X−1 under
the supervision of a biological parent29 with time-(−1) mean Z−1. By analogy with Eq. (5),
Z0 = [(1 − p) + pγ1]M−1 + pX0 − pγ1Z−1;
we can now write Z−1 similarly as
Z−1 = [(1 − p) + pγ1]M−2 + pX−1 − pγ1Z−2,
and use this expression to substitute Z−1 above:
Z0 = [(1 − p) + pγ1]M−1 + pX0 − pγ1[(1 − p) + pγ1]M−2 − p2γ1X−1 + [pγ1]2.Z−2
Thus, by iterating this process,
Z0 =
∞ X
t=1
(−pγ1)t−1 
[(1 − p) + pγ1]M−t + pX−(t−1)
	
.
Now a child shares approximately 50% of her genes with her parent, who in turn shares approxi-
mately 50% of his genes with his own parent, etc.; thus, the correlation between M0 and M−t can
be taken to be 2−t, so their covariance is 2−tv0. Furthermore, M0 is uncorrelated with observations;
thus,
Cov[M0,Z0] = [(1 − p) + pγ1]v0
∞ X
t=1
(−pγ1)t−1

1
2
t
.
Finally, to compute vZ0, note that, in steady state, it must be the case that v1 = vZ0; furthermore,
clearly Cov[M0,Z0] = r0
√
v0vZ0. Thus, we can substitute for the latter quantity in Eq. (21),
assume that v1 = vZ0 and solve for vZ0: we get
vZ0 = v1 =
[(1 − p) + pγ1]2v0 + p2vX − 2p(1 − p)Cov[M0,Z0]
1 − [pγ1]2 .
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32B Online Appendix
B.0.1 Proof of Proposition C.4 and Corollary C.5.
Begin by writing the parent’s objective function in Eq. (34) in a way that is consistent
with both the model of Sec. 2.1 and Sec. C.3. In both cases, the child’s guess at time 2
takes the form w(X1 + ¯ a)+(1−w)M0: if the child is unaware of the parent’s action, then
w =
pX
p0+pX, whereas, under the textbook equilibrium assumption, Lemma C.3 implies that
w =
pX(1−γe)
p0+pX(1−γe)2. We get
E

(X1 + ¯ a − M0)2 + δ[X2 − (1 − w)M0 − w(X1 + ¯ a)]2|M

. (26)
It is also convenient to calculate the expectation: adding and subtracting M inside the two
squared-loss terms, we get
E
h
(X1 + ¯ a − M) + (M − M0)]2+ (27)
+δ[(X2 − M) + (1 − w)(M − M0) + w(M − X1 − ¯ a)]2|M
i
=
=¯ a2 +
1
pX
+ (M0 − M)2 + 2¯ a(M − M0)+
+δ

1
pX
+ (1 − w)2(M0 − M)2 + w2

1
pX
+ ¯ a2

+ 2w(1 − w)(M0 − M)¯ a

=
=(1 + δw2)¯ a2 − 2[1 − δw(1 − w)](M0 − M)¯ a+ (28)
+δ

(1 − w)2(M0 − M)2 + w2 1
pX

+
1 + δ
pX
+ (M0 − M)2.
Diﬀerentiating with respect to ¯ a and rearranging terms yields
¯ a =
1 − δ(1 − w)w
1 + δw2 (M0 − M), (29)
and it is also immediate to verify that the second derivative of Eq. (28) is strictly positive.
For w =
pX
p0+pX, we obtain the optimal intensity γT = γ1 in Eq. (11) of Thm. 2.1
(where BT+1 = BL = B2 = 1).
In the textbook-equilibrium case, Eq. (29) instead implies that a necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition for a linear equilibrium with intensity γe is γe =
1−δ(1−w)w
1+δw2 . This can be
rewritten as follows: notice that [p0+pX(1−γe)2]2w(1−w) = pX(1−γe)[p0−pXγe(1−γe)];
then the required condition is
γe =
[p0 + pX(1 − γe)2]2 − δpX(1 − γe)[p0 − pXγe(1 − γe)]
[p0 + pX(1 − γe)2]2 + δp2
X(1 − γe)2 .
33Multiplying by the denominator, which is strictly positive, and rearranging yields
[p0 + pX(1 − γe)2]2(1 − γe) − δpX(1 − γe)[p0 − pXγe(1 − γe) + γepX(1 − γe)] = 0
which can be rewritten as
(1 − γe)
n
[p0 + pX(1 − γe)2]2 − δp0pX
o
= 0.
Therefore, one solution is always γe = 1. To ﬁnd other solutions, assume γe 6= 1, divide by
1 − γe and rearrange:
pX(1 − γe)2 =
p
δp0pX − p0.
Since p0 > 0, the rhs is positive provided δpX > p0. If this condition holds, then the above
holds if and only if
1 − γe = ±
s√
δp0pX − p0
pX
.
Note also that, if δpX > p0, then
√
δp0pX − p0 < δpX − p0 < pX, which implies that the
argument of the outer root is strictly between 0 and 1.
Choosing the positive sign in the above equation yields the expression for γe in Prop.
C.4, henceforth denoted γ+; by the argument just given, γ+ ∈ (0,1); Choosing the negative
sign instead yields γ− ≡ 2 − γ+.
To complete the proof of Cor. C.5, it is convenient to express the minimized value of
the parent’s objective function by substituting for ¯ a in Eq. (28) using Eq. (29); we get
[1 − δ(1 − w)w]2
1 + δw2 (M0 − M)2 − 2
[1 − δw(1 − w)]2
1 + δw2 (M0 − M)2+
+δ

(1 − w)2(M0 − M)2 + w2 1
pX

+
1 + δ
pX
+ (M0 − M)2 =
=
−[1 − δw(1 − w)]2 + δ(1 − w)2 + δ2(1 − w)2w2 + 1 + δw2
1 + δw2 (M0 − M)2 +
1 + δ(1 + w2)
pX
=
=
2δw(1 − w) + δ(1 − w)2 + δw2
1 + δw2 (M0 − M)2 +
1 + δ(1 + w2)
pX
=
=
δ(1 − w)[2w + 1 − w] + δw2
1 + δw2 (M0 − M)2 +
1 + δ(1 + w2)
pX
=
=
δ
1 + δw2(M0 − M)2 +
1 + δ(1 + w2)
pX
; (30)
since w2 =
p2
X(1−γe)2
[p0+pX(1−γe)2]2 and (1−γ−)2 = (γ+−1)2 = (1−γ+)2, it follows that the payoﬀ
to the parent in the two equilibria with intensity coeﬃcients γ+ and γ− is the same.
34Finally, suppose that ¯ a = γe(M0 − M) is an equlibrium parental intervention, with
b1 = M0 and b2 as in Lemma C.3, and ﬁx k ∈ R. Then let ¯ a0 = ¯ a + k, b0
1 = b1 + k
and b0
2 = b2; clearly, (a,b) constitutes an equilibrium in which the child “ﬁlters out” the
additive constant k both in her time-1 guess and in her updating rule. It is immediate to
verify that this new equilibrium is payoﬀ-equivalent to the original one.
C OMITTED: Extensions
C.1 Costly Parental Intervention
So far we have assumed that the parent’s payoﬀ per period coincides with that of the child
for any given realization of uncertainty Xt and any choice of actions ¯ at and ¯ bt. In particular,
this implies that the only “cost” of parental intervention is via the induced distortion of
the child’s beliefs.
We now extend our basic model and introduce an explicit cost of parental intervention.
For analytical tractability, we assume that this additional cost is quadratic in the parent’s
action ¯ at. Speciﬁcally, the parent’s loss at time t, given Xt, ¯ at and ¯ bt, is now
(Xt + ¯ at −¯ bt)2 + C¯ a2
t (31)
where C ≥ 0. Our main result, Theorem 2.1, admits a straightforward generalization to
this environment.
Theorem C.1 Under costly parenting, the optimal parenting policy a = (a1,...,aT) ∈ A
is at = γt(Ma
t−1 − M), where
γt =
1 − δBt+1
pX
pt
pt−1
pt
1 + C + δBt+1

pX
pt
2, BT+1 =
L−T X
τ=1
δτ−1

pT
pT+τ−1
2
, Bt =
δBt+1
1 + δBt+1

pX
pt
2.
(32)
Furthermore, γt ∈ (0,1).
Notice that the optimal parenting policy has exactly the same features as in the costless
case; the only diﬀerence is the denominator of the intensity of intervention γt, which now
includes the cost parameter C. Thus, it is still the case that partial sheltering occurs at
the optimum, so our interpretation of the evidence from behavioral genetics (Sec. 3 is
preserved under costly parenting.
35C.2 Simultaneous learning in the Gaussian framework
Another interesting extension is simultaneous learning. Children typically engage in mul-
tiple simultaneous learning processes; furthermore, experimental evidence points to com-
plementarities between diﬀerent aspects of cognitive development.30 It is then natural
to ask how a supervisor might take advantage of these complementarities to resolve the
sheltering/learning trade-oﬀ, and more generally aid in the development process.
The Gaussian framework can be readily extended to handle learning of multiple tasks.
As we shall presently demonstrate, the main technical ﬁnding is that the parent’s inter-
vention in any given task is, in general, a linear function of the child’s bias in all tasks.
Preliminary numerical exploration suggests than the parent may take advantage of this in
interesting and somewhat unexpected ways; this invites further investigation.
We continue to assume that the child lives for L > 1 periods, and that teaching termi-
nates at time T ∈ {1,...,L − 1} (i.e. there is at least one teaching period).
The child must now learn how to perform n tasks. Extending the notation of Section
2.1, let M ∈ Rn denote the vector describing the correct way to perform each task on
average and; for every t = 1,...,T, let Xt denote the n-dimensional random vector that
describes the correct way to perform each task at time t.
The parent knows the value of M; the child has a multinormal prior over its possible
values, with precision matrix p0 and mean vector M0. The parent and child both believe
that, conditional upon M, each Xt is a multinormal vector with mean M and precision
matrix pX. Thus,
Xt|M ∼ N
 
M,p−1
X

and M ∼ N
 
M0,p−1
0

. (33)
The parent’s and child’s actions at time t, denoted by ¯ at and ¯ bt respectively, are also
n-dimensional real vectors. The child’s loss at time t is given by
(Xt + ¯ at −¯ bt)0(Xt + ¯ at −¯ bt).
We can also incorporate a quadratic cost-of-parenting term, extending the model in Sec.
C.1. Thus, the parent’s loss at time t is
(Xt + ¯ at −¯ bt)0(Xt + ¯ at −¯ bt) + ¯ a0
tC¯ at,
where C is an n × n symmetric matrix.
By analogy with the single-task case, a parenting policy is a tuple (a1,...,aT) such that
at : Rn × Rn·(t−1) → Rn for each t. That is, the parent’s intervention at time t depends
30For instance, Gopnick and Meltzoﬀ [40] report that children who use more names are more likely to
exhaustively sort objects into diﬀerent categories (see also Waxman [71]).
36upon the value of the vector M and the realizations of the random vectors X1,...,Xt−1.
Similarly, a policy for the child is a tuple (b1,...,bL) such that, for every t, bt : Rn·(t−1) →
Rn. We continue to denote the set of policies for the parent and the child by A and B
respectively.
Finally, in accordance with the assumptions discussed in the main text, given a par-
enting policy (a1,...,aT) ∈ A, the child’s beliefs about M at the end of each time period
t = 0,1,...,L are characterized by the precision matrix pt ≡ p0+tpX and the mean vector
Ma
t =
(
p−1
t

p0M0 + pX
Pt
s=1[Xs + as(M,X1,...,Xs−1)]

t ≤ T
p−1
t
h
p0M0 + pX
PT
s=1[Xs + as(M,X1,...,Xs−1)] + pX
Pt
s=T+1 Xs
i
t > T
Also, the optimal policy ba = (ba
1,...,ba
L) ∈ B for the child, given the parent’s policy
a = (a1,...,aT) ∈ A, satisﬁes ba
t = Ma
t−1 for all t = 1,...,L. Again, these are immediate
extensions of the corresponding results for the single-task case.
The parent still minimizes her discounted expected loss. Theorem 2.1 can then be
generalized as follows.
Theorem C.2 For t = 1,...,T, the optimal parenting policy a = (a1,...,aT) ∈ A satis-
ﬁes at = Γt · (Ma
t−1 − M), where Γt is inductively deﬁned as follows:
BT+1 =
L−T X
τ=1
δτ−1ptp−1
t+τ−1p−1
t+τ−1pt,
Γt = [I + C + δpXp−1
t Bt+1p−1
t pX]−1[I − δpXp−1
t Bt+1p−1
t pt−1],
Bt = (I − Γt)0(I − Γt) + δ(pt−1 + pXΓt)0p−1
t Bt+1p−1
t (pt−1 + pXΓt).
C.3 “Textbook” Equilibrium analysis
With regards to equilibrium analysis of the “Hand-Holding” models, three main ﬁndings
can be mentioned; we focus on the single-task environment for simplicity.
First, if parental intervention is intrinsically costless (as in our main model), then for
any choice of the parameters, the following proﬁle of strategies is a (perfect Bayesian)
equilibrium: the parent chooses at = M0 − M for t = 1,...,T; the child guesses M0
in the ﬁrst T periods, disregarding the realization of Xt + at, and then proceeds as in
the unsupervised case from time T + 1 onwards. In this equilibrium the parent opts for
a fully sheltering strategy, which however prevents learning in the ﬁrst T periods: the
child is aware that he is essentially observing draws from a normal distribution with mean
M + at = M0 in each period, regardless of the realized value of M, and hence he simply
discards these observations. Thus, in this equilibrium, the child does not learn anything
37while being supervised by the parent. However, it is easy to see that this particular
equilibrium disappears as soon as costs are introduced.
Second, under natural assumptions on parameters, there exists a partially sheltering
equilibrium in which the parent’s strategy is linear in the child’s bias, as in Theorem 2.1.
In particular, it is characterized by a system of equations similar to Eq. (11), except that
the quantities pt and Bt are replaced by functions of all the equilibrium values of γ1 ...γT.
Third, simple two-period examples demonstrate that the child’s welfare can be lower or
higher in equilibrium than under the assumptions about beliefs stated above. Intuitively,
the child can make better use of the information he receives (because he can partially ﬁlter
out the parent’s intervention); on the other hand, this induces the parent to shelter more
than she would under the original assumptions about beliefs.
To illustrate these points, we solve a two-period, equilibrium version of the basic model
in Sec. 2.1 (this can be extended to arbitrarily many periods). Since a policy for the parent
consists of a single function of the true mean M, we drop time indices and denote it simply
by a : R → R. Equilibrium quantities will be denoted by the subscript “e”.
Begin by conjecturing a linear equilibrium: that is, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where
the parent’s equilibrium policy is linear in the child’s initial bias: ae(M) = γe(M0 − M),
where γe ∈ R is the equilibrium intensity of intervention (again dropping the time index).
Then, in equilibrium, the child knows that her time-1 observation is a realization of X1 +
a(M) = X1 + γe(M0 − M), and not just X1; thus, she updates accordingly. The following
Lemma provides the details.
Lemma C.3 For all γ ∈ R,
E[M|X1 + γ(M0 − M) = x] =
p0 − pXγ(1 − γ)
p0 + pX(1 − γ)2 M0 +
pX(1 − γ)
p0 + pX(1 − γ)2x.
In a linear equilibrium with intensity of intervention γe, the child’s policy be = (be
1,be
2)
must then satisfy
be
1 = M0, 31 be
2(x) = E[M|X1 + γe(M0 − M) = x] ∀x ∈ R.
Consequently, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium
31In any equilibrium, the child’s guess at time 1 only inﬂuences her loss at time 1, because the parent
must choose an action a(M) without observing b
e
1. Thus, in particular, in a linear equilibrium the child’s
optimal choice is b
e
1 = E[X1 + γ
e(M0 − M)] = M0.
38is that, for every M ∈ R,
γe(M0 − M) ∈ argmax
¯ a∈R
E

(X1 + ¯ a − M0)2 + (34)
+ δ

X2 −
p0 − pXγe(1 − γe)
p0 + pX(1 − γe)2 M0 −
pX(1 − γe)
p0 + pX(1 − γe)2(X1 + ¯ a)
2  
 M

The following Proposition and Corollary characterize the linear equilibria of this game.
Proposition C.4 For all parameter values, there is a linear equilibrium with γe = 1.
Furthermore, if δpX > p0, there is a linear equilibrium with
γe = ˆ γ ≡ 1 −
s√
δp0pX − p0
pX
∈ (0,1).
Corollary C.5 If there is a linear equilibrium with γe = ˆ γ, then there is also a payoﬀ-
equivalent linear equilibrium with γe = 2−ˆ γ; there are no other linear equilibria. Further-
more, if γe ∈ {ˆ γ,2 − ˆ γ,1} is the intensity of intervention in a linear equilibrium, then for
every k ∈ R there is a payoﬀ-equivalent equilibrium with a(M) = k + γe(M0 − M).
Thus, as noted above, under the condition δpX > p0, one equilibrium exhibits the
essential features of the solution we consider in Sec. 2: the parent’s policy is linear in
the child’s bias, and in particular the intensity coeﬃcient lies between zero and one. This
coeﬃcient is also decreasing in δ, as in Theorem 2.1. Such an equilibrium exists, provided
the child is not too slow to learn relative to the complexity of the task: otherwise, the
parent fully shelters (γe = 1) in any linear equilibrium.
Also, adding a constant k to the parent’s action a leads to a formally distinct but
payoﬀ-equivalent equilibrium: the child merely adjusts her guesses b0 and b1 so as to oﬀset
the constant k. Finally, it turns out that, if there is an equilibrium with γe ∈ (0,1) as
in Prop. C.4, then there is another linear equilibrium with intensity coeﬃcient equal to
2 − γe: intuitively, this is the “mirror image” of the original linear equilibrium; the child
can also adjust her learning rule accordingly, and again one obtains a payoﬀ-equivalent
equilibrium. The above Corollary summarizes these facts.
Table 2 below shows that, depending on parameter values, the child’s welfare, as per-
ceived by the informed parent, may be either higher or lower under textbook equilibrium
behavior. The ﬁgures in Table 2 suggest that, if the child’s initial bias is large, then for
relatively low values of pX the child’s expected loss is higher in a linear equilibrium than
under the assumption that the child is unaware of the parent’s intervention, whereas the
opposite is true for relatively high values of pX. However, this ranking is reversed if the
39child’s bias is small. Additional numerical experimentation seems to conﬁrm this pattern.
Finally, the expected loss in a linear equilibrium with γe ∈ (0,1) may be either higher
or lower than in the full-sheltering equilibrium with γe = 1; as one might expect, the
full-sheltering equilibrium is superior for if the child’s initial bias is small.
δ p0 pX M0 − M γ Loss γe Eqm Loss Eqm loss (γe = 1)
0.9 1 2 2 0.5714 3.7214 0.5867 3.8041 4.55
0.9 1 5 2 0.5385 2.7204 0.5264 2.3013 3.98
0.9 1 2 0.5 0.5714 1.3107 0.5867 1.2885 1.175
0.9 1 5 0.5 0.5385 0.6435 0.5264 0.7103 0.605
Table 2: Textbook Equilibrium and Child Welfare
D OMITTED: Discussion
D.1 Additional Related Literature
Inﬂuencing other agents’ beliefs is a recurring theme in information economics and game
theory. The main contrast between our model and most contributions on communication
in models of asymmetric information is the following. In these models, the presence of
conﬂicting incentives either makes it impossible to credibly communicate all the information
or introduces the necessity of distorting actions in order to make communication credible.
In our model on the other hand, although incentives are aligned, information cannot be
directly communicated but must be transmitted through a (possibly costly) manipulation
of the learning process. The informed agent in our models faces very diﬀerent incentives
from those in standard models of asymmetric information.
A “teaching” metaphor is sometimes employed to describe strategies in the literature
on learning in games: cf. e.g. Kalai and Lehrer [48], Section 2.4. However, this seems
mainly an expository device to clarify features of certain strategies; players do not have
any private information to convey (besides their future dispositions to play). In the absence
of the “teacher,” the “learner” would have nothing to learn, which is deﬁnitely not the case
in supervised learning models.
The literature on social learning is also related. In particular, Smith and Sorensen [65]
analyze optimal experimentation and its interaction with informational herding. Although
teaching is not the focus of their paper, these authors provide a two-period example featur-
ing a “professor” who takes the more informative of two possible actions so as to maximize
the “student’s” expected payoﬀ. This intriguing example may point in the direction of
40a full-blown model of imitative learning, or “teaching by doing” on the parent’s part; by
comparison, our concern in this paper is “learning by doing” on the child’s part, under the
supervision of the parent.
Benabou and Tirole [10] consider the interplay between the provision of incentives and
the self-conﬁdence of an agent: provision of explicit incentives by an informed principal
(e.g. a parent) may be a negative signal of the ability of an agent (the child). They show
that in some circumstances, explicit incentives can be counterproductive. Other authors
(e.g., Rubinstein [61]) and Brunnemeier and Parker [22]) have investigated how beliefs may
be optimally chosen by a ‘principal’ to maximize the payoﬀs of an ‘agent’. In these settings,
optimistic beliefs may be advantageous.
Ettinger and Jehiel [35] propose a model of deception in which “manipulative” agents
inﬂuence the beliefs of less sophisticated, “deceived” agents. In particular, less sophisti-
cated agents make inferences on the basis of coarser information about their opponent than
is available in the game—an assumption consistent with the so-called “fundamental attri-
bution error.” This bounded-rationality assumption leads to the possibility of deception.
It should be noted, however, that no deception is possible if both agents are fully rational;
by way of contrast, as we show in Sec. C.3, the main qualitative features of our analysis
are consistent with textbook-equilibrium analysis.
Finally, the transmission and adoption of cultural traits had been developed by, among
others, Cavalli Sforza-Feldman [25], and Boyd-Richerson [20]. In most of these literature,
the transmission is independent of any of the choices of the parents. Bisin and Verdier [13],
[14], and Bisin, Topa, and Verdier [15] develop models in which cultural transmission occurs
as the result of the socialization eﬀort endogenously chosen by the parent. However, the
eﬀectiveness of socialization is modeled as a reduced-form function of some eﬀort measure.
D.2 Applications
The approach outlined in this paper may be useful to address broader issues pertaining
to learning in a multi-person environment. First, at an abstract level, schooling may
be viewed as supervising more than one simultaneous learning process, with only limited
opportunities to target interventions to individual learners. For instance, in the setting of
§2.1, assume that there n ‘students’ with diﬀerent priors about M, and one ‘instructor’.
At every time t, each student must guess the realization of the r.v. Xt; the instructor
must choose the same level of intervention at for all students. If bt,i is student i’s guess
at time t, his payoﬀ is −(Xt + at − bt,i)2. If students do not observe each other’s actions,
the model is an n-fold repetition of the model in Section 2.1, except that the instructor’s
choice of at must be the same in every “copy” of the problem. We can then analyze the
41impact of diﬀerent objective functions for the instructor on (i) the distribution of ability
in the population of students, and (ii) the ability of a single student, given the distribution
of other students’ abilities.
A more interesting model of peer eﬀects may plausibly be obtained by allowing stu-
dents to observe each other’s guesses. This would likely be beneﬁcial for “low-ability”
students; however, it might be the case that high-ability students are better oﬀ than they
would be if actions are unobservable. Intuitively, in a very heterogeneous class, the instruc-
tor’s choice of at is likely to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the choice she would make if
she was interacting with a single high-ability student; but, as low-ability students improve
due to the presence of high-ability peers, the class becomes less heterogeneous, and as a
consequence even high-ability students may beneﬁt.
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